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Genes and the Just Society
Preface

ARTI K. RAI*

For philosophers influenced by egalitarian ideals, the principle that a just
society should act to mitigate inequality has long been a bedrock
assumption. Even egalitarian theories of justice have, however, generally
drawn a distinction between two types of inequality, social and natural.
Many egalitarian theorists have argued that the central type of inequality
with which society needs to be concerned is social inequality. In other
words, if person A is born poor and person B rich, then society should
strive to redistribute resources from B to A. Although redistribution does
not require equalization of wealth, sufficient redistribution should occur
to ensure that all persons have equal opportunity. In contrast, egalitarian
theorists have often seen natural inequalities as relatively fixed and
hence of more peripheral concern to justice. Thus, if person A is born
with great mathematical talent and person B with no such talent, justice
cannot require that some of B’s mathematical talent be redistributed to A.
Indeed, it may not even require that B be compensated by A for his lack
of natural talent.
In the future, however, the availability of genetic interventions that
enhance natural abilities may blur the distinction between the social and
the natural. This blurring of distinctions is the central issue with which
the authors of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice are
concerned.1 The authors of this book are four distinguished philosophers
who have achieved particular renown in the field of bioethics. The
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authors address what moral obligations we as a society, and as individuals
within that society, might have in the face of interventions that give us
“choice” over what was previously “chance.” The authors’ analysis
covers a variety of vexing problems, including the following: what
genetic interventions must, as a matter of distributive justice, be made
available to all; what types of reproductive decisionmaking may be
permissible or even required; and what the availability of genetic
interventions will do with respect to our attitudes towards the disabled.
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